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OPINION OF THE COURT
__________________
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge.
There

are

two

interrelated

issues

in

this

appeal.

First, whether the venue provision of the Financial Institution
Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 ("FIRREA"), 12

U.S.C. § 1821(d)(6)(A) (Supp. II 1990),1 governs only actions
brought against the failed depository institution or whether it
also

applies

to

actions

against

the

institution's

receiver.

Second, whether the claims procedures established in FIRREA, 12
U.S.C. § 1821(d), cover actions against the receiver as well as
actions against the failed institution.
This case arises out of the failure of a state bank,
Citytrust of Connecticut.
United

States

District

Hudson United Bank brought suit in the
Court

for

the

District

of

New

Jersey

against Chase Manhattan Bank of Connecticut, the Federal Deposit
Insurance

Corporation,

and

Chase's

wholly

owned

subsidiary,

Consolidated Asset Recovery Corporation, seeking a declaratory
judgment of its rights to certain funds as a result of its
participation interest in loans made by the failed bank.

The

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, as receiver for the failed
bank, moved to transfer the action to the District of Connecticut
under 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(6)(A).

The district court granted the

motion to transfer, holding that the claims procedures applied to
actions against the receiver and that a change of venue was
required under FIRREA.

The court then certified the issue for

interlocutory appeal.

Hudson United Bank v. Chase Manhattan

Bank, NA, 832 F. Supp. 881 (D.N.J.

1

. FIRREA, Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) (appears in
various sections of the United States Code). The current version
of § 1821(d) appears in 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d) (Supp. V 1993), but
there have been no material changes in the parts relevant to this
dispute. Unless otherwise noted, citations to 12 U.S.C. § 1821
will be to the 1990 version.

1993).

We will affirm.

I.
Plaintiff/appellant Hudson United Bank ("Hudson") is a
New Jersey corporation.2

Defendant/appellee Chase Manhattan Bank

of Connecticut, NA ("Chase"), is a national association of the
state of Connecticut, with offices in Connecticut.

Citytrust of

Connecticut ("Citytrust"), the failed bank now in receivership,
was a state bank licensed in Connecticut.

Kleinberg Electric is

a New York corporation that was a customer of Citytrust and is
now

in

bankruptcy,

defendants.

allegedly

as

a

result

of

actions

of

the

Paul and Carol Kleinberg, the guarantors on the

loan, were both New Jersey residents at the time the loan was
executed.
In 1987, Citytrust extended to Kleinberg Electric a $1
million term loan and a $1.25 million line of credit.

Hudson

bought a 63% interest in Kleinberg Electric's term loan as part
of a Loan Participation Agreement.

In 1991, Citytrust failed and

was placed under the control of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation as receiver.

Following standard procedure, the FDIC

sought a buyer for Citytrust and found Chase, which entered into
a Purchase and Assumption Agreement with the FDIC allowing Chase
to evaluate Citytrust's assets and "put" any unwanted assets back

2

. Hudson and its predecessor-in-interest, HUB National Bank,
formerly known as Meadowlands National Bank, are collectively
called "Hudson." All its employees with knowledge of this matter
reside in New Jersey.

to the receiver.

Chase's subsidiary, Consolidated Asset Recovery

Corporation ("CARC"), was to manage (with FDIC supervision) any
Citytrust assets that were retained or reacquired by the FDIC.
Sometime after Citytrust's bankruptcy in August 1991
and the start of this new arrangement, Hudson ceased receiving
payments for its participation interest in the Kleinberg loan.
In

addition,

the

Kleinberg

line

of

credit

was

terminated,

apparently upon the closing of the FDIC's Purchase and Assumption
Agreement with Chase.

Hudson, 832 F. Supp. at 883.

Two months

later, Chase "put" the Kleinberg loans back to the receiver, to
be managed by CARC.
Hudson claimed it had not been notified of Citytrust's
bankruptcy

and

learned

of

it

only

in

November

inquired about the discontinued loan payments.

1991

when

it

In January 1992

CARC accelerated the loans, allegedly causing Kleinberg to file
for bankruptcy.

Even after filing for bankruptcy, Kleinberg

continued to make payments to CARC on the Citytrust loans, but
CARC allegedly failed to remit to Hudson its full share of those
payments.

By early 1992 it appeared that Hudson was losing money

on the Kleinberg loan.

In March 1992, however, Chase deposited

$476,176.80 into an account of Hudson's at Chase, and Hudson
withdrew that money as payment in full of the loan participation.
Chase then decided it had deposited the money by mistake and
asked for it back.
judgment

of

litigation

its

Hudson responded by seeking a declaratory

rights

expenses.

to

the

Hudson

funds,

punitive

alleged

breach

damages,
of

the

and
Loan

Participation Agreement, breach of the duty of good faith, breach

of

fiduciary

duty,

and

fraudulent

concealment.

Chase

counterclaimed for the return of the money.
After filing its action, Hudson asked the FDIC receiver
whether

administrative

review

prerequisite to bringing suit.

of

and

moved

to

claims

was

a

necessary

The FDIC forwarded a claim notice

to Hudson, which Hudson filed.
claim

its

transfer

The FDIC then disallowed the
the

case

to

the

District

of

Connecticut under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (1988)3 and 12 U.S.C. §
1821(d)(6)(A).

The FDIC contended that New Jersey was the wrong

venue because
12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(6)(A) specifies that a claimant can only
bring

suit

in

the

district

where

institution

had

its

principal

place

District of Columbia.

the
of

failed

depository

business

or

in

the

Because Citytrust's principal place of

business was in Connecticut, the FDIC asserted that the case
should be transferred there.
§

1821(d)(6)(A)

only

Hudson opposed transfer, contending

refers

to

claims

against

the

failed

depository institution, not to claims based on actions taken by
the FDIC after the bank failed, which are actually against the
receiver, not the institution.

3

.

The district court granted the

Section 1406(a) provides:
The district court of a district in which is
filed a case laying venue in the wrong
division or district shall dismiss, or if it
be in the interest of justice, transfer such
case to any district or division in which it
could have been brought.

FDIC's

motion

to

transfer

and

then

certified

the

following

question for interlocutory appeal:4
Does the venue provision in [FIRREA],
12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(6) apply to an action
which is brought against the receiver for
wrongs allegedly committed by the receiver
rather than the failed institution?

II.
We

have

conclusions of law.

plenary

review

over

the

district

court's

Tudor Dev. Group, Inc. v. United States

Fidelity & Guar. Co., 968 F.2d 357, 359 (3d Cir. 1992); Gregoire
v. Centennial Sch. Dist., 907 F.2d 1366, 1370 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 899 (1990).

We are not limited to the certified

question, but may rule on other issues relevant to the appeal.

4

. We must decide whether the district court had jurisdiction to
certify the question after it had ordered the transfer. The
general rule is that the transferor court loses jurisdiction when
the files in a case are physically transferred to the transferee
court. See, e.g., Wilson-Cook Medical, Inc. v. Wilson, 942 F.2d
247, 250 (4th Cir. 1991); Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Country
Chrysler, Inc., 928 F.2d 1509, 1516-17 (10th Cir. 1991); Robbins
v. Pocket Beverage Co., 779 F.2d 351, 355 (7th Cir. 1985).
In this case, the district court granted the motion to
transfer on September 17, 1993. On September 24, 1993, Hudson
served notice of a motion to certify the issue to this Court, and
on October 12, 1993, the district court granted a stay of the
transfer until it decided the motion to certify. Nothing in the
record indicates the district court had completed (or even begun)
the process of physically transferring the files. We assume the
district court delayed physical transfer of the files to allow
the parties time to file a motion for certification. Cf.
Chrysler Credit, 928 F.2d at 1517 & n.7 (observing this type of
delay is the "preferred approach"). The district court had
jurisdiction to certify the question we consider here.

Johnson v. Alldredge, 488 F.2d 820, 823 (3d Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 882 (1974).
The district court granted the motion to transfer venue
under FIRREA, 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(6)(A).
is

entitled

"Provision

determination of claims."

for

agency

The provision on venue
review

12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(6).

or

Subparagraph

(A) provides:
In general
Before the end of the 60-day period beginning
on the earlier of-(i) the end of the period described
in paragraph (5)(A)(i) with respect
to any claim against a depository
institution
for
which
the
Corporation is receiver; or
(ii) the date of any notice of
disallowance of such claim pursuant
to paragraph (5)(A)(i),5
the
claimant
may
request
administrative
review of the claim . . . or file suit on
such claim (or continue an action commenced
before the appointment of the receiver) in
the district or territorial court of the
United States for the district within which
5

.

Section 1821(d)(5)(A)(i) provides:
(5) Procedures for determination of claims
(A) Determination period
(i) In general
Before the end of the 180-day period
beginning on the date any claim against a
depository institution is filed with the
Corporation as receiver, the Corporation
shall determine whether to allow or disallow
the claim and shall notify the claimant of
any determination with respect to such claim.

12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(5)(A)(i).

judicial

the depository institution's principal place
of business is located or the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia
(and such court shall have jurisdiction to
hear such claim).
12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(6)(A) (footnote supplied).
As we have noted, Hudson contends this subparagraph,
with

its

venue

depository

provision,

institution;

applies

that

is,

only
it

to

applies

claims
only

against
to

against Citytrust and not to claims against the FDIC.

a

claims

If true,

the FDIC as receiver cannot request a change of venue under
FIRREA.

In addition, Hudson maintains the entire subsection (d)

is inapplicable to breach of contract actions like the present
dispute.

Finally,

Hudson

asserts

that

under

certain

circumstances application of the provisions in subsection (d)
would create an unconstitutional result.
A.
Hudson

maintains

that

claims

against

the

receiver

cannot be considered under § 1821(d)(6)(A),6 but must be analyzed
6

. The applicability of the venue provision is the principal
issue in this case, so it is helpful to locate the provision
within the statute and to describe the scope of the section in
which it occurs. Section 1821, entitled "Insurance Funds,"
covers all aspects of the FDIC's administration of insurance
funds. The two subsections at issue are: subsection (d), "Powers
and duties of Corporation as conservator or receiver" and
subsection (e), "Provisions relating to contracts entered into
before appointment of conservator or receiver." 12 U.S.C. §
1821(d), (e).
Subsection (d) relates to the powers and duties of the
Corporation ("The Corporation" refers in this context to the
FDIC), and is divided into 19 paragraphs. Those at issue are: ¶
(3), "Authority of the receiver to determine claims" (giving the
notice requirements for claimants, including timing); ¶ (5),
"Procedures for determination of claims" (setting out the period

under § 1821(d)(5)(C) ("Disallowance of claims filed after end of
filing

period")7

or

under

§

1821(d)(6)(B)

("Statute

of

(..continued)
during which claims will be decided); ¶ (6), "Provision for
agency review or judicial determination of claims" (establishing
review procedures, including the venue provision); and ¶ (13)
"Additional rights and duties" (including a jurisdictional
limitation on judicial review). 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(3), (5),
(6), (13). Subsection (e) deals with contracts made before
appointment of the receiver. Hudson discusses one of the 13
paragraphs in § 1821(e), ¶ (2), "Timing of repudiation."
Subsection (e), unlike (d), sets out no specific review
procedures for claimants to follow. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e).
7

.

Section 1821(d)(5)(C) provides:
(5) Procedures for determination of claims
. . . .
(C) Disallowance of claims filed after end of
filing period
(i)

In general
Except as provided in clause (ii),
claims filed after the date specified in
the notice published under paragraph
(3)(B)(i) shall be disallowed and such
disallowance shall be final.
(ii) Certain exceptions
Clause (i) shall not apply with
respect to any claim filed by any
claimant after the date specified in the
notice published under paragraph
(3)(B)(i) and such claim may be
considered by the receiver if-(I) the claimant did not
receive notice of the appointment
of the receiver in time to file
such claim before such date; and
(II) such claim is filed in
time to permit payment of such
claim.
12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(5)(C).

Limitations").8

8

.

Hudson

points

out

that

§

1821(d)(13)(D)9

Section 1821(d)(6)(B) provides:
(6) Provision for agency review or judicial
determination of claims
. . . .
(B) Statute of limitations
If any claimant fails to-(i) request administrative
review of any claim in accordance
with subparagraph (A) or (B) of
paragraph (7); or
(ii) file suit on such claim
(or continue an action commenced
before the appointment of the
receiver),
before the end of the 60-day period described
in subparagraph (A), the claim shall be
deemed to be disallowed (other than any
portion of such claim which was allowed by
the receiver) as of the end of such period,
such disallowance shall be final, and the
claimant shall have no further rights or
remedies with respect to such claim.

Id. § 1821(d)(6)(B).
9

.

Section 1821(d)(13)(D) provides:
(13) Additional rights and duties
. . . .
(D) Limitation on judicial review
Except as otherwise provided in this
subsection, no court shall have jurisdiction
over-(i) any claim or action for payment
from, or any action seeking a
determination of rights with respect to,
the assets of any depository institution
for which the Corporation has been
appointed receiver, including assets

specifically provides for claims against the receiver while §
1821(d)(6)(A),
From

this

which

Hudson

contains
concludes

the
that

venue

provision,

the

venue

does

not.

provision

(§

1821(d)(6)(A)) if read literally applies only to claims against
the depository institution, not to claims against the receiver.
The FDIC disagrees, contending Congress intended § 1821(d)(6)(A)
to

include

claims

against

the

receiver.

The

district

court

agreed with the FDIC.
The district court acknowledged that Hudson's argument
had some force if § 1821(d)(6)(A) were read without reference to
the related parts of FIRREA that establish claims procedures.
But the district court rejected Hudson's interpretation because
it found that applying the claims procedures' venue provision to
all

claims

consistent
FIRREA.

(including
with

the

claims

statutory

against

the

structure

receiver)
and

the

was

more

purposes

of

Following the approach we employed in Rosa v. Resolution

Trust Corp., 938 F.2d 383 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 582
(1991),10 the district court looked to the other sections of
(..continued)
which the Corporation may acquire from
itself as such receiver; or
(ii) any claim relating to any act
or omission of such institution or the
Corporation as receiver.
Id. § 1821(d)(13)(D).
10

. Hudson reminds us that in Rosa we construed § 1821(d)(13)(D)
of FIRREA literally, holding that it did not apply to entities
unless they were explicitly included. Rosa, 938 F.2d at 393-94.
In Rosa, we held 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(13)(D) parts (i) and (ii)
applied only to the claims specified. See supra note 9 for the
text of this subparagraph. Thus, with respect to this two-part
subsection, we held (i) applied only to claims against failed

FIRREA

that

detail

the

claims

process

for

guidance

in

understanding the scope of the venue provision.11
(..continued)
institutions while (ii) applied to claims against failed
institutions specified in (i) as well as to claims against the
receiver of such institutions. Rosa, 938 F.2d at 393-94.
Hudson argues that application of Rosa's literal
approach to § 1821(d)(6)(A) is proper and leads to the conclusion
that § 1821(d)(6)(A) excludes claims against receivers since they
are not mentioned. But § 1821(d)(13)(D), which we interpreted in
Rosa, differs from the one under consideration in that it
comprises two parts, one of which addresses claims relating to
the institution and the other which pertains to claims relating
to either the depository institution or the receiver.
This structure made us confident in Rosa that the
failure to mention claims against the receiver in the first part
was not just careless drafting. Where Congress took care in part
(ii) to include claims relating to the receiver as well as the
depository institution, we could assume that Congress intended in
part (i) to include only claims against the institution and to
exclude those against the receiver. Section 1821(d)(6)(A),
however, contains no analogous divisions, and thus the import of
the language is not as clear as it was for us in Rosa. Hudson's
argument that we should read § 1821(d)(6)(A) literally, as we did
§ 1821(d)(13)(D), fails because of the difference in structure of
the two subparagraphs.
11

. The district court properly followed the "cardinal rule that
a statute is to be read as a whole, . . . since the meaning of
statutory language, plain or not, depends on context." King v.
St. Vincent's Hosp., 112 S. Ct. 570, 574 (1991) (citation
omitted). As the Supreme Court has stated: "Statutory
construction . . . is a holistic endeavor. A provision that may
seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder
of the statutory scheme . . . because only one of the permissible
meanings produces a substantive effect that is compatible with
the rest of the law . . . ." United Sav. Ass'n v. Timbers of
Inwood Forest, 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988) (citations omitted); see
also Smith v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2050, 2056-57 (1993)
(construing scope of statutory language by reading various
provisions together); Trathen v. United States, 198 F.2d 757, 760
(3d Cir. 1952) (observing "[t]he meaning of any given word in a
statute is properly determined by reading the language in
question together with other sections of the act").

The district court first considered § 1821(d)(5)(A),12
which

outlines

the

claims

procedures

of

FIRREA.

See

Praxis

Properties, Inc. v. Colonial Sav. Bank, S.L.A., 947 F.2d 49, 6263

(3d

Cir.

1991)

procedures).

(reviewing

FIRREA's

administrative

claims

Noting that the venue provision (§ 1821(d)(6)(A))

defines the claims to which it applies by express reference to §
1821(d)(5)(A), the district court concluded that § 1821(d)(5)(A)
and

§

1821(d)(6)(A)

subparagraphs

apply

by

applied

to

their

terms

the

same

to

"any

claims.
claim

Both

against

a

depository institution" for which the FDIC is the receiver.
Having linked § 1821(d)(6)(A) to § 1821(d)(5)(A), the
district

court

receiver

were

then

considered

covered

under

§

whether

claims

1821(d)(5),

because

1821(d)(6)(A) would have to cover them as well.
court

first

observed

that

we

have

against

routinely

if

so,

§

The district

assumed

1821(d)(5) applies to claims against the receiver.

the

that

§

See Rosa, 938

F.2d at 395-96; Althouse v. Resolution Trust Corp., 969 F.2d
1544, 1545-46 (3d Cir. 1992); Praxis Properties, 947 F.2d at 6264.

The

district

court

then

looked

to

§

1821(d)(13)(D)

to

explain why claims against the receiver had to be within the
scope

of

§

1821(d)(5)

and

therefore

within

the

scope

of

§

1821(d)(6)(A).

12

. The relevant part of 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(5)(A) appears supra
note 5.

Section 1821(d)(13)(D)13 bars judicial review except as
otherwise provided in § 1821(d).

The jurisdictional bar of §

1821(d)(13)(D) extends explicitly to claims against the receiver
as well as to those against the depository institution.
unless

§

1821(d)(5)

allows

administrative

review

of

Thus,
claims

against the receiver, there would be no mechanism to review those
claims--they
1821(d)(13)(D)
elsewhere.

would
and

be
there

barred
would

from
be

judicial
no

review

provision

for

by

§

review

The district court reasoned that if the paragraphs on

administrative and judicial review of claims (§ 1821(d)(6)(A) and
§ 1821(d)(5)(A)) did not apply to claims against the receiver,
then § 1821(d)(13)(D) would compel a complete bar of review of
claims against the receiver because no grant of jurisdiction
exists elsewhere in § 1821(d).

As the district court reasoned:

"Logic dictates that the claims barred by paragraph (13)(D) must
coincide with those that may be filed under the administrative
procedures

of

paragraph

(5).

Otherwise,

paragraphs

(5)

and

(13)(D) would bar relief in the district court without providing
relief elsewhere, and FIRREA would become a source of immunity
for the Receiver."

Hudson United Bank v. Chase Manhattan Bank,

NA, 832 F. Supp. 881, 886 (D.N.J. 1993).

The district court

found that Congress did not intend FIRREA's claims process to
immunize the receiver, but rather wanted to require exhaustion of

13

.

For the text of § 1821(d)(13)(D), see supra note 9.

the receivership claims process before going to court.14

Id. at

885-86.
On appeal, Hudson tries to answer this argument by
finding implicit jurisdiction for claims against the receiver in
§ 1821(d)(5)(C) and (d)(6)(B) which refer to "any claims."15

But

neither section addresses claims against the receiver explicitly,
and Hudson's attempt to find a grant of jurisdiction in them is
strained.16

We find the district court's reading of § 1821(d)

14

. As this is a matter of statutory construction, consideration
of legislative history would be appropriate. But neither party
has cited material relevant to this venue dispute, and our own
research has failed to uncover any.
15

. For the text of these paragraphs, see supra notes 7 and 8,
respectively.
16

. Hudson also claims Congress intended to exclude claims
against the receiver from the ambit of § 1821(d)(6)(A) by
establishing two different procedures for processing claims, one
for claims against the failed institutions (treated in §
1821(d)(6)(A) and (d)(5)(A)) and another for claims against the
receiver (treated in § 1821(d)(6)(B) and (d)(5)(C)), but without
making that distinction explicit in the statute.
A look at the titles of the various parts of the
statute supports the district court's view that Congress intended
to establish a single set of procedures in § 1821(d). See, e.g.,
INS v. National Ctr. for Immigrants' Rights, Inc., 112 S. Ct.
551, 556 (1991) (noting title of statute or section can aid
interpretation of statute's meaning); House v. Commissioner, 453
F.2d 982, 987 (5th Cir. 1972) (observing the propriety of using
section headings to determine a statute's meaning). The general
title of § 1821(d)(6) is "Provision for agency review or judicial
determination of claims," and the title of § 1821(d)(6)(A), which
contains the venue provision, is "In general." This leads to the
natural inference that procedures contained in the "In general"
part apply to all cases of agency review or judicial
determination of claims absent explicit exceptions. 12 U.S.C. §
1821(d)(6)(A).
No such inference suggests a separate set of procedures
in either § 1821(d)(6)(B) entitled "Statute of limitations" or §

more convincing and consistent with congressional purpose as well
as with our opinion in Rosa.
It

is

true

that

difficult to interpret.17

FIRREA

is

awkwardly

written

and

But as the district court noted, the

purpose of § 1821(d)(5)(A) and (d)(13)(D) was to force plaintiffs
with claims against failed depository institutions to file their
claims

under

FIRREA's

administrative

filing them in federal court.

claims

procedures

before

H.R. Rep. No. 54(I), 101st Cong.,

1st Sess. 291, 418-19 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 86,
214-15.

The purpose was not to immunize certain claims from

review.

The district court also found application of the venue

provision to claims against the receiver consistent with the
claims

process's

purpose

of

promoting

efficiency.

Treating

claims against the receiver differently from claims against the
institution would foster inefficiency by forcing the FDIC to
"defend actions at various locations throughout the country, with
the attendant disruption of the Bank's records and personnel,
[and] the defendant's task would become further complicated."
Hudson, 832 F. Supp. at 887 (citation omitted).
(..continued)
1821(d)(5)(C) "Disallowance of claims filed after end of filing
period." Further, there is no mention there of separate
procedures for claims against the receiver. We do not believe
Congress intended to establish separate procedures in such an
indirect and disjointed manner. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(6)(B),
(d)(5)(C).
17

. As one court lamented when faced with the task of
interpreting § 1821(d): "FIRREA's text comprises an almost
impenetrable thicket . . . . [C]onfusion over its proper
interpretation is not only unsurprising--it is inevitable."
Marquis v. FDIC, 965 F.2d 1148, 1151 (1st Cir. 1992).

Accordingly, we hold that the venue provision in 12
U.S.C. § 1821(d)(6)(A) applies to claims against the receiver.
This

holding

answers

the

question

we

expressly

left

open

in

National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. City Savings, F.S.B., 28
F.3d

376,

387

n.12

1821(d)(13)(D).

By

(3d

Cir.

deciding

1994),
that

as

the

to

the

reach

administrative

of

§

claims

procedures and the jurisdictional bar have concurrent scope, we
avoid

the

possibility

raised

in

National

Union

that

§

1821(d)(13)(D) could become "an independent and outright bar of
jurisdiction" rather than a mere exhaustion requirement if §
1821(d)(13)(D) were to have broader reach than the administrative
claims procedures.

National Union, 28 F.3d at 387 n.12.
B.

Hudson's second statutory construction argument is that
because this action involves the receiver's repudiation of a
contract, it falls within § 1821(e) rather than § 1821(d).

We

will consider this issue even though Hudson did not present it to
the district court.

Merican, Inc. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.,

713 F.2d 958, 962 n.7 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1024
(1984) (on interlocutory appeal, court can consider all grounds
which might require reversal).
In

arguing

this

point

in

its

brief,

Hudson

relied

almost entirely on Heno v. FDIC, 996 F.2d 429 (1st Cir. 1993)
("Heno

I"),

("Heno II").

withdrawn

and superseded

by

20

F.3d

1204

(1994)

By the time of oral argument, the Court of Appeals

for the First Circuit had withdrawn Heno I and replaced it with

Heno II.

At oral argument, counsel for Hudson announced that it

still wished to rely on the reasoning of Heno I.
Heno had an executory contract with a bank that failed.
Although it had notice of the FDIC's appointment as receiver
before the expiration of the time for filing claims under §
1821(d), it had no claim until after the bar date because the
FDIC had not yet repudiated the contract and so it remained
executory.

Therefore, Heno had no claim to file and no claim

subject to administrative review.

Absent prior administrative

review, the court lacked jurisdiction to hear Heno's claim.
U.S.C. § 1821(d)(13)(D).

12

Heno had sent the FDIC two post-bar

date letters requesting that the FDIC inform Heno of its position
on the contract.

Under § 1821(d), however, the letters could not

provide the court with jurisdiction because Heno had not filed a
claim before the bar date.
reasoned
procedures

Congress

did

established

not
under

In Heno I, the court of appeals
intend
§

the

1821(d)

administrative
to

apply

to

review

preclude

judicial review of post-receivership claims arising after the 90day filing period.

12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(3)(B).

Instead, the

"reasonable period" time bar of 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(2)18 would
18

.

Section 1821(e)(2) provides:
(e) Provisions relating to contracts entered
into before appointment of conservator or
receiver
. . . .
(2) Timing of repudiation
The conservator or receiver . . . shall
determine whether or not to exercise the

govern Heno's claim.

Heno II, 20 F.3d at 1208 (discussing Heno

I).
The court of appeals withdrew Heno I after realizing
that Heno's claim was in fact not barred under § 1821(d) once the
FDIC's

internal

agency

manual

procedures

for

post-bar date claims were properly applied.

processing

such

The FDIC, in its

petition for rehearing and then at reargument, represented that
if

it

had

claims,

considered

Heno's

Heno's

letters

would

claims
have

as

been

contract
sufficient

internal procedures to avoid the time bar.
that

the

FDIC

would

allow

administrative

remove the bar to judicial review.

repudiation

Id.

under

its

This implied

review

and

thereby

Under those circumstances,

the court did not find it necessary to treat Heno's contract
claim

against

consider

the

the

receiver

parties'

under

arguments

§

1821(e)

under

§

and

1821(d).

went

on

Id.

to
The

internal agency manual procedures persuaded the court of appeals
that resort to the application of § 1821(e) in breach of contract
actions against the receiver was not routinely necessary to avoid
an irrational result.

See id. at 1210-14 (setting forth the

internal manual procedures in an appendix to the opinion).
In the present case, § 1821(d) will not apply to bar
judicial review because of untimely filing for administrative
review.

Hudson's

claim

has

already

been

subjected

(..continued)
rights of repudiation under this subsection
within a reasonable period following . . .
appointment.
12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(2).

to

administrative review and the district court had jurisdiction
over it.

Nevertheless, Hudson argues that § 1821(d) is generally

inappropriate for breach of contract actions, relying on the
reasoning of Heno I.

Insofar as the rationale of Heno I depended

on the agency's refusal to review Heno's claim, Hudson's argument
must fail as no such agency refusal occurred here.

If Hudson's

argument is based on the notion that Heno I made the more general
statement

that

contract

claims

against

the

receiver

are

not

subject to administrative review, it is inconsistent with Heno II
and also with our opinion in Rosa, in which we held that all
claims for monetary relief arising out of the receiver's alleged
breach of a contract were subject to the administrative review
procedures of § 1821(d).
we

find

unconvincing

Rosa, 938 F.2d at 392-93.

the

other

case

on

which

Furthermore,

Hudson relies,

Homeland Stores, Inc. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 17 F.3d 1269,
1275 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 317 (1994), which
explicitly differs from Rosa on this point.
C.
Finally, Hudson contends the application of the time
constraints imposed by 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(6)(A), combined with
the time bar contained in § 1821(d)(3)(B) (which sets the cut-off
date for claims submitted to administrative review), could in
some cases raise significant constitutional problems of improper
delegation of authority, denial of due process, and taking under
the Fifth Amendment.

Hudson maintains this could result where

the receiver causes injury to a party, giving rise to a cause of
action after the date has passed by which creditors were to bring

their claims under 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(3)(B).19

The receiver,

which has discretion to hear some late claims under 12 U.S.C. §
1821(d)(5)(C), could exercise its discretion against hearing the
claim.20

19

.

This failure to go through the administrative review

Section 1821(d)(3)(B) provides:
(3) Authority of receiver to determine claims
. . . .
(B) Notice requirements
The receiver, in any case involving the
liquidation or winding up of the affairs of a
closed depository institution, shall-(i) promptly publish a notice
to the depository institution's
creditors to present their claims,
together with proof, to the
receiver by a date specified in the
notice which shall be not less than
90 days after publication of such
notice; and
(ii) republish such notice
approximately 1 month and 2 months,
respectively after the publication
under clause (i).

Because the receiver must publish notice "promptly," the bar date
will fall approximately 6 months after it is appointed. Claims
filed after the bar date are disallowed, with certain exceptions,
under § 1821(d)(5)(C).
20

. The text of § 1821(d)(5)(C) appears supra note 7. In fact,
the discretion of the receiver to hear late claims is limited,
and would not apply to many of the post-closing claims against
the receiver that Hudson describes. Claims that are filed late
where the claimant had timely notice of the appointment of the
receiver but the claim did not arise before the end of the cutoff date would not qualify as exceptions under
§ 1821(d)(5)(C)(ii). That was the case in Heno v. FDIC, 20 F.3d
1204, 1207-08 (1st Cir. 1994), in which the complainant
concededly had actual notice of the FDIC's appointment but held
no claim to assert until after the cut-off date.

procedure would in turn create a bar to judicial review under §
1821(d)(13)(D).21
391-92

(3d

Cir.),

Rosa v. Resolution Trust Corp., 938 F.2d 383,
cert.

denied,

112

S.

Ct.

582

(1991).

A

plaintiff whose claim the receiver had declined to review as
untimely would therefore be left with no remedy for the alleged
wrong.
We

recently

recognized

that

due

process

might

be

violated where a party that had no reasonable opportunity to
submit a claim for administrative review had its claim barred
from judicial review.

National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. City Sav.,

F.S.B., 28 F.3d 376, 389-90 n.16 (3d Cir. 1994).

Hudson argues

that to prevent the possibility of this unconstitutional result
each claim arising from the acts or omissions of the receiver
must proceed not under 12 U.S.C. § 1821 (d)(6)(A), but instead
under § 1821(d)(5)(C), which treats disallowance of claims filed
after the end of the filing period.
1821(d)(6)(A)

for

filing

for

The time constraint in §

administrative

review

of

claims

against the receiver would then not apply to the claims, nor
would the venue provision.

Hudson would also have us read the

permissive language of § 1821(d)(5)(C)22 as mandatory.

See FDIC

v. diStefano, 839 F. Supp. 110, 118 (D.R.I. 1993) (reading the
"may" in § 1821(d)(5)(C) as "must"); Scott v. Resolution Trust
Corp. (In re Scott), 157 B.R. 297, 318 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1993)

21

.

22

For the text of this subparagraph, see supra note 9.

. That language is "and such claim may be considered by the
receiver." 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(5)(C).

(same), withdrawn, 162 B.R. 1004 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1994).

This,

Hudson states, would relieve the due process concerns raised by
the FDIC having discretion not to hear certain claims, which, if
exercised, could operate to bar jurisdiction in the courts.
Hudson reads the due process requirements too broadly.
We

did

not

suggest

in

National

Union

or

elsewhere

process mandates two separate claims procedures.
stated

that

where

the

jurisdictional

bar

that

due

Rather, we

contained

in

§

1821(d)(13)(D) could not constitutionally be applied, a court
would have jurisdiction over the claim.
at 389-90 n.16, 393 n.22.
direct

or

suggest

the

National Union, 28 F.3d

Where the statute does not otherwise
recognition

of

two

separate

claims

procedures, we decline to apply the jurisdictional bar where it
would

yield

an

unconstitutional

result.

A

single

claims

procedure is more consistent with our decision in Rosa, which
held that claims against the receiver, as well as claims against
the failed institution, were subject to the "statutory exhaustion
requirement"

of

administrative

jurisdiction over them.

review

before

938 F.2d at 392-93.

appear there is no constitutional infirmity.
decide that here.

the

courts

had

Thus, it would
But we need not

The possibility of a jurisdictional bar does

not arise under the facts of this case because the administrative
review process was completed.

III.
For the reasons set forth, the judgment of the district
court will be affirmed.

